Daily Incentive and Jump-base in a Non-Real-Time Apparel Manufacturing Context

Robert Dean Morrison, Juan Angel Chavarria, Claudia Patricia Dole, Brenda Maritza Dole

Abstract


This study summarizes piecework incentive systems and examines two apparel manufacturing factories that used daily incentive calculations at one time and weekly incentive calculations at another. In addition, one factory implemented a multiple base-rate incentive system, often called jump-base. The data shows that, when not controlled, daily incentive can facilitate operators engaging in fraudulent activity such as ticket-holding. With fraud controlled, daily incentive calculation makes little difference in overall pay; therefore, it may have individual level motivational effects by nullifying the effect of averaging one-bad-day into the week. While jump-base may enhance productivity in lower performing operators or modules, one must take great care when designing such systems.

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